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Willingness to Protest over Resource Extraction in Latin America
Abstract: Protests over resource extraction have increased in Latin America in recent years. 
However, significant variation exists in the region in terms of citizen’s willingness to protest 
against resource extraction. We argue that this variation is based on the interaction of factors at 
both the individual and state levels. Individual-level characteristics, such as social engagement, 
influence the likelihood of protest activity. State-level characteristics, such as the quality of 
governance, also present opportunities for engaged individuals to challenge resource extraction.  
Following political mediation theory, we argue that collective action strategies are likely to be 
more productive in some political contexts than in others. Thus socially engaged citizens in high-
quality governance environments are more willing to participate in protests over resource 
extraction vis-a-vis their counterparts in low-quality governance settings. We utilize survey data 
and state-level governance data across Latin America to determine why some individuals are 
willing to demonstrate against resource extraction while others are not.
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1. Introduction
Latin America has the highest number of resource conflicts in the world (Özkaynak et al., 
2015), and countries like Peru, Mexico, and Chile experience the most conflicts (OCMAL, 2017).  
Latin America is also known to be the world’s most dangerous region for environmental activists, 
including those who contest resource extraction (Global Witness 2014).  Existing literature has 
sought to explore the varied motivations and goals pursued by citizens near the extractive frontier 
(e.g., Arsel et al., 2016a; Arce, 2014, 2016; Bebbington & Bury, 2013; Conde & Le Billon, 2017; 
Svampa & Antonelli, 2009). This scholarship shows that protesters seek to defend basic rights, 
such as water access and quality, the integrity of land and landscapes, and/or the cultural survival 
of indigenous peoples; other protesters seek a more equitable distribution of the revenues, 
royalties, or other economic benefits generated from extraction.
Much of the existing literature examines the variation of resource conflicts cross-nationally 
(Arce & Miller, 2016; Arce et al., 2018; Haslam & Tanimoune, 2015) and sub-nationally (Arce & 
Hendricks, 2019; Arellano-Yanguas, 2010; Mähler & Pierskalla, 2015; Ponce & McClintock, 
2014; Orihuela et al., 2019). Some studies examine the relationship between mineral wealth and 
conflicts (Arce & Hendricks, 2019; Arellano-Yanguas, 2010). Other studies explore the 
relationship between geo-referenced extractive areas and conflicts (Haslam & Tanimoune, 2015; 
Mähler & Pierskalla, 2015). Together, these studies confirm the extraction-conflict nexus. 
However, while studies have used individual-level surveys to explore protest participation more 
generally (Moseley, 2015; Boulding, 2014), none have examined why individuals are willing to 
protest over resource extraction across Latin America.1  What individual- and state-level factors 
influence citizens’ willingness to protest over extraction?
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As several studies document, there are clear power imbalances in the negotiations over 
resource extraction between host communities and extractive industries. Backed by national 
governments embracing the “extractive imperative” (Arsel et al., 2016b)2, extractive industries 
diffuse the claims of protesters by providing selective material rewards to the leaders of protest 
organizations (e.g., bribes or employment opportunities) or by spending money on high-profile 
projects in collaboration with local authorities, mostly municipal mayors (e.g., the beautification 
of the town’s central plaza or the rebuilding of the town’s school). The goal is to win the support 
of the local population and authorities through a series of small concessions. Citizens who are 
opposed to resource extraction as a development strategy face the daunting challenge of reversing 
or blocking mining concessions; their resistance efforts entail the sustained social engagement of 
networks of activists and their organizations. In other cases, protesters are not opposed to 
extraction, but rather seek to negotiate (or re-negotiate) the terms of extraction. Protesters demand 
prior consultation rights, make calls for environmental and social impact studies, and petition 
equitable distribution of resource rents to host communities (Conde, 2016; Conde & Le Billon, 
2017).3
Moreover, as Boulding (2014) and Moseley (2015) show, individuals do not make political 
decisions in a vacuum. Rather, the context in which they operate affects their political behavior 
(similar Barnes & Córdova, 2016). Moseley (2015) has aptly shown that the quality of institutions 
shapes an individual’s decision to attend a protest rally or demonstration.  Specifically, socially-
engaged citizens in low-quality institutional settings are substantially more likely to protest 
because they are unable to influence policy via state instituions as these are perceived to be 
ineffective or unresponsive.  In this view, formal institutions operate as a safety valve for citizen 
complaint and satisfaction, but this safety valve malfunctions when institutional structures become 
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unresponsive to societal demands, making “street protests” the relief mechanism for built-up 
societal pressure.
While protests are commonly viewed as a byproduct of ineffective and unresponsive 
institutions, our paper examines an individual’s willingness to protest over resource extraction (not 
her actual participation in a protest rally or demonstration as in Moseley), and advances an 
alternative interpretation of the impact of institutions on protest likelihood. Building on political 
mediation theory (Amenta & Young, 1999; Amenta, Caren, Chiarello, & Su, 2010), we argue that 
the success of collective action is politically mediated as movements are more influential in some 
institutional contexts as opposed to others. This theory suggests that protests and political 
outcomes are rarely connected directly. Rather, the impact of protests on outcomes is mostly 
indirect or mediated by the institutional context in which they occur. These institutions produce a 
country’s policymaking capabilities and policy characteristics, and they range from court decisions 
to legislative decrees and executive orders. Therefore, we argue that the quality of national 
policymaking shapes an individual’s willingness to participate in protests over resource extraction 
as this environment often determines the capacity of the state to deliver on protesters’ demands. In 
countries with a high quality of governance, citizens are willing to protest over resource extraction 
because they perceive the government as possessing the capacity to address their claims. 
Conversely, in countries with a low quality of governance, socially-engaged citizens view 
institutions as incapable of addressing long-term policymaking change, and accordingly, are less 
willing to protest over resource extraction.4
We begin this article by providing background information on the significance of resource 
extraction to developing Latin American economies, including a discussion of how extraction 
encourages contention. Thereafter, we explain how governance quality mediates the relationship 
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between social engagement and the likelihood to protest. We precede the presentation of our 
research design with two examples from the region. The empirical section of the article draws on 
cross-national surveys of Latin America (Latinobarómetro, 2015) and state-level data from the 
Inter-American Development Bank’s Governance Quality Index (Franco Chuaire & Scartascini, 
2014) to examine the variation in protest likelihood in the region.  The conclusion summarizes the 
contributions of this article and suggests new areas for future research.
2. Resource Extraction as a Development Strategy
Driven by record-high commodity prices, extractive sector investments increased nearly 
ten-fold between 2000 and 2013, from US$ 86 billion to US$ 735 billion (ECLAC, 2013). In 2014, 
Latin American received approximately 25 percent of global exploration investment flows and 
held more than 28 percent of the world’s mineral investment portfolio. The region is the world’s 
leading source of minerals and the second most important source of oil (ECLAC, 2013). It 
produces 15 percent of the world’s gold, 45 percent of silver and 40 percent of copper. Peru, 
Mexico and Chile are the top gold, silver, and copper producers, respectively. In 2013, according 
to the World Trade Organization (2014), oil and minerals accounted for 40 percent of total Latin 
American exports, compared to a global average of 22 percent. In the same year, extractive 
activities’ rents represented more than 15 percent of GDP in resource-rich Latin American 
countries (Walter, 2016).
While resource extraction contributes to regional macroeconomic growth, the “extractive 
imperative” (Arsel et al., 2016b) as a national development strategy also leads to clashes with host 
communities over the use of land and water. However, not all mobilizations against resource 
extraction concern the adverse impact of mining on livelihoods and the environment. Soaring 
commodity prices yield remarkable profits, and mining-related taxes have become the most 
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important intergovernmental transfer linked to resource extraction. These transfers encourage a 
sizeable number of mobilizations over the distribution and use of these resource revenues across 
multiple tiers of government—local, provincial, regional and national. Challengers also seek 
improved transparency on resource revenues (Haufler 2014). 
Likewise, protesters increasingly challenge private firms directly over the state—especially 
in localities with large-scale mining firms (Haslam & Tanimoune, 2016; Gustafsson, 2017).  
Amengual (2018) shows that when local movements are fragmented, multinational mining firms 
target specific organizations with private goods to placate opposition and protect future access to 
mining locations. However, the state remains at the epicenter of most extractive conflicts as several 
campaigns include claims related to environmental degradation, land rights and the protection of 
livelihoods.
3. Individual and Contextual Factors Shaping Protest Likelihood
Moseley (2015) uses the Latin American Public Opinion Project’s (LAPOP) 
AmericasBarometer surveys to examine the individual- and state-level characteristics, explaining 
the variation in protest participation across twenty-four countries in Latin America. Substantively, 
his paper reveals the importance of civic engagement as a main driver of contention. As Moseley 
(2015) explains:
[e]gaged citizens are more likely protestors for two reasons. First, they are more likely to 
have access to the key organizational tools required for communicating and mobilizing. 
Second, through their active involvement in political and nonpolitical organizations, they 
have more exposure to the relative strengths and weaknesses of formal institutional 
structures, which provides them with information about the necessity and/or effectiveness 
of protest participation. (p. 13)
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Moreover, Moseley (2015) shows that institutional quality conditions civic engagement, 
shaping an individual’s decision to mobilize. While low-quality institutions incite protest 
participation, high-quality institutions, which allow citizens to influence policy via state 
institutions, suppress it. Institutions thus operate as a safety mechanism for citizen complaint and 
satisfaction; when institutions are ineffective or unresponsive, protests follow. In Moseley’s (2015) 
words: “[e]ngaged citizens in low-quality institutional environments are almost twice as likely to 
participate in a protest as their counterparts in high-quality institutional settings” (p. 30-31). 
Therefore, social engagement and institutional quality interact to explain the variation in protest 
participation in Latin America. 
We agree with Moseley (2015) on the salience of civic engagement as it relates to protest 
likelihood, but we differ on the effects of institutions. Following political mediation theory 
(Amenta & Young, 1999; Amenta et al., 2010), we argue that collective action strategies are likely 
to be more productive in some political contexts than in others. Accordingly, challengers’ ability 
to influence outcomes depends partly on conditions they can control (e.g., their ability to mobilize, 
forms of organization, and strategies) and partly on the varied political contexts and institutional 
settings they face.5  Crucial to this argument, this literature informs us that protests’ effects on 
outcomes are rarely direct. Instead, a broad range of institutions involved in the policymaking 
process – from the enforcement to the adjudication of the law (e.g., court decisions, legislative 
decrees and executive orders) – shape the long-term consequences of protests.  To be clear, the 
paper does not examine the outcomes of protests.  Rather it suggests that an individual’s 
willingness to protest over resource extraction is shaped by what government institutions may 
accomplish as a result of her collective action.
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Because individuals lack complete information, institutions become a salient source of 
external data and provide cues to determine citizens’ policy stances. These “source cues”—or 
heuristics—reduce citizens’ position-taking costs thereby conditioning their proclivity to 
participate in politics (Barnes & Córdova, 2016, p. 673; Zaller, 1992; Mondak, 1993).6  
Specifically, Barnes and Córdova (2016) argue that citizens utilize information “on the 
institutional capacity of government as a whole and . . . on the capacity of the different institutions 
that make up government to work cooperatively and consistently [to] produce good policy 
outcomes” (p. 673-674). Consequently, challengers assess collective action strategies based on the 
government’s ability as a whole, and not isolated to the current administration, to deliver social 
policies affecting citizens’ daily lives. If government cannot provide basic services to citizens, then 
“the government is unlikely to gain sufficient credibility in the eyes of the public to secure high 
policy support” (Barnes & Córdova, 2016, p. 674), leaving even socially-engaged citizens in such 
settings with little incentive to mobilize. Conversely, socially-engaged citizens in high-quality 
governance environments are willing to participate in a protest rally or demonstration because they 
perceive a higher probability of influencing positive outcomes as compared to in low-quality 
governance environments.
Our dependent variable also differs from Moseley (2015).  Moseley’s dependent variable 
asks respondents if they participated in a street march or public demonstration in the previous 
twelve months,7 but does not address likely political action against resource extraction specifically. 
In Moseley’s sample, for instance, Bolivia, Peru, and Argentina were most likely to experience 
protests, while El Salvador, Panama, and the Dominican Republic were least likely to. By contrast, 
in our sample, the countries where respondents are more willing to protest over resource extraction 
were Colombia, Chile, and Costa Rica, while Ecuador, Uruguay, and Venezuela were the least 
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willing. This comparison goes to show that the countries that experience protest participation at 
large are different from the countries where citizens are willing to protest over resource extraction. 
To summarize, protests over resource extraction may take on a variety of issues, from 
environmental protection to indigenous self-determination to the distribution of resource revenues,  
and can last several weeks, months, or even years. Challengers employ myriad strategies to set the 
extraction agenda, open a direct dialogue with government officials, or adapt existing policies 
(Silva, Akchurin, & Bebbington, 2018). Such efforts require a stable policymaking environment 
to achieve these long-term objectives.  In our view, a citizen’s institutional environment is not a 
static feature that triggers higher or lower levels of collective action.  Rather, a citizen’s willingness 
to protest over resource extraction is shaped by her ability to leverage the strengths of the 
institutional environment to her advantage. Thus, the willingness to participate in a protest over 
resource extraction should be higher / lower where the quality of governance environment is strong 
/ weak.
Before going further, an important clarification about the role of institutions is warranted. 
Eisenger (1973) and Tarrow (1998) argued that we should observe a curvilinear relationship 
between protests and the openness of political institutions. Open political structures discourage 
protests by extending conventional means of political participation to redress grievances. Closed 
political structures also discourage protests because of repression, which altogether disincentivizes 
protest. But protest is higher in mixed political structures because some access to political 
institutions exists and the state’s capacity to repress is somewhat limited.8  These arguments focus 
on the emergence of protest, specifically the mobilization of challengers. Additionally, critics 
argue that political structure models are often conceptualized too broadly to be tested empirically 
(Goodwin & Jasper, 1999). In contrast, we focus on how the policymaking capabilities and policy 
10
characteristics of different polities mediate the likelihood to shape positive outcomes. Hence, when 
we speak about the governance environment, we are thinking about policymaking capabilities and 
policy characteristics, not formal institutions (i.e., the relative openness of political structures).
4. Protesters and their Governance Environment
To recast our main argument, the governance environment that challengers face shapes 
their likely participation in politics. A high-quality governance environment emboldens aggrieved 
groups by highlighting the state’s ability to meet these grievances, consequently reinforcing 
engaged citizens’ willingness to participate in collective action. In contrast, a low-quality 
governance state discourages engaged citizens to participate in politics as they perceive a lower 
probability of indirectly influencing outcomes vis-à-vis weak policymaking institutions. 
Two examples may help illustrate how citizens in extractive areas interact with institutions 
to achieve their goals. As the literature shows, extractive conflicts are varied and involve different 
sets of grievances. One illustrative case focuses on a conflict over the distribution of mining’s 
benefits; the other case demonstrates a conflict over basic rights. For our purposes however, the 
nature of the grievance is less relevant than the interaction that mobilizations have with 
governmental institutions.
On the one hand, leading copper producer Chile has 37 resource related conflicts, the 
second highest number of observed conflicts regionally (OCMAL, 2017). The country also 
possesses high-quality governance environment based on the Inter-American Development Bank’s 
Governance Quality Index (Franco Chuaire & Scartascini, 2014). It has a Governance Quality 
score of 2.35—among the highest levels in our sample (about 1.962 standard deviations above the 
mean). A high-quality governance state like Chile is expected to have several resource conflicts 
(see Figures 1 and 3). 
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Chile’s copper mines are located in the northern region of the country, specifically in the 
underpopulated areas of the Atacama Desert.  When union contracts expire, typically every three 
to four years, it sets the stage for new negotiations to establish new wages and benefits, and if these 
talks fail, union workers strike.  In February 2017, negotiations were unsuccessful and the 2,500 
member-union at Escondida, the world’s largest copper mine operated by BHP Billiton, went on 
strike. Union workers demanded a salary increase of 7 percent and a bonus. Escondida, in turn, 
offered a third of the bonus demanded by the union with no salary increase. Union workers ended 
the strike by invoking a rarely used legal provision, Article 369, allowing them to extend their old 
contract for 18 months, after which both parties must try to reach a new agreement, and companies 
like Escondida are legally obligated to comply.
The strike lasted 43 days, ending just before major labor law changes, which were widely 
seen as bolstering organized labor groups. President Michelle Bachelet’s center-left government 
approved the new law in 2016. The new law requires companies to offer the minimum benefits in 
a previous contract as the negotiating floor. By returning to their old contracts, union workers will 
enjoy existing benefits and working conditions. But more importantly, they will hold the next 
round of negotiations under the “upcoming labor law that strengthens their hand.” 9  The union 
told media outlets that the labor law changes “had informed their negotiations.”10
On the other hand, Ecuador posseses significant oil reserves. The country produces 
approximately 557,000 barrels of oil per day (OPEC, 2015), with oil rents comprising 
approximately 13.7 percent of its 2014 GDP (World Bank, 2016).11  Unlike Chile, Ecuador only 
has 7 resource conflicts, among the fewest number of conflicts in our sample (sample mean is 
12.38) (OCMAL, 2017). Ecuador also has a Governance Quality score of 1.01, far lower than the 
1.41 mean value (about .824 standard deviations below the mean) (see Figure 3). 
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In Ecuador, demands for environmental justice over the negative externalities of oil 
extraction have been common and aggrieved groups have funneled their claims through the courts. 
In 1993, for instance, Ecuadorian indigenous people of the Oriente region filed a class action 
lawsuit in a US federal court against Texaco (Aguinda v. Texaco).12  The complainants alleged 
that between 1964 and 1992 Texaco’s oil operations polluted the rainforests and rivers in Ecuador, 
resulting in environmental damage and detrimental health effects for locals. Chevron acquired 
Texaco in 2001. In 2002, the US federal court dismissed the lawsuit, deciding Ecuador was the 
appropriate venue for litigating these claims.
In 2011, an Ecuadorian judge charged Texaco/Chevron for extensive environmental and 
cultural damages. The court ordered Chevron pay $8.6 billion in damages and clean-up costs, with 
damages increasing to $18 billion if Chevron did not issue a public apology. After several court 
appeals, Ecuador’s Supreme Court upheld the ruling against Texaco/Chevron for environmental 
damages, but halved damages to $9.51 billion.
The ruling set off a lengthy, complex series of international proceedings, including 
international arbitration because the ruling violated a US-Ecuador bilateral investment treaty, 
lawsuits in Canada targeting Chevron assets in this country, and a racketeering lawsuit against the 
complainant’s lawyers and representatives in US federal court because the ruling in Ecuador 
involved a conspiracy to commit extortion.
In March 2014, US district judge Lewis Kaplan ruled in Chevron’s favor, finding that the 
Ecuadorian community’s lawyers fabricated evidence, made bribes, and ghost-wrote court 
documents. The plaintiffs were therefore barred from collecting the $9.51 billion judgment 
because the “decision was obtained by corrupt means.”  In August 2016, a US Court of Appeals 
agreed with the lower court’s ruling. In June 2017, the US Supreme Court declined to hear the 
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plaintiffs’ appeal, meaning that the lower court decision, blocking the enforcement of the 
Ecuadorian award, stood.
Ecuadorian indigenous groups often rely on international allies to further their claims 
against oil drilling (Eisenstadt & West, 2017). For example, American activist-lawyer Steven 
Donziger and California-based Pachamama Foundation led the charge in the $9.51 billion 
judgment. While these alliances speak to the generally inadequate political representation of 
indigenous people, they also reveal Ecuador’s low-quality governmenance environment. Chevron 
did not deny the environmental damage in the Ecuadorian rainforest, but when Texaco/Chevron 
drilled for oil in Ecuador, they were doing so as a partner of PetroEcuador (formerly CEPE), the 
country’s state-run oil company.13 Indigenous groups “strongly criticized the central government’s 
failure to attend to environmental degradation, but were divided over whether to further explore 
and drill for oil (Eisenstadt & West, 2017, p. 245).  Moreover, when Attorney Donziger was shown 
evidence contradicting the contamination spread from oil pits, he was unyielding. “This is 
Ecuador, O.K.,” he said. “At the end of the day, there are a thousand people around the courthouse, 
you will get whatever you want. Sorry, but it’s true.”14
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
To summarize—and following political mediation theory—a protest rally or demonstration 
seldom decides its final outcome. Instead, movements interact with several institutions, such the 
federal, provincial, or local governments, to influence positive outcomes. Our two examples 
demonstrate this logic. The conflicts in Chile and Ecuador surrounded divergent grievances. The 
Chilean conflict encompassed the distribution of benefits, while the Ecuadorean case was a dispute 
over basic rights. Nonetheless, protests alone did not determine the either dispute’s outcome, and 
the successful outcome of these events depended on positive interactions with institutions. In 
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Chile, union workers drew on their governance environment’s strengths, including Article 369 and 
the new labor law, to achieve positive results. In contrast, despite the well-known mobilizing 
capacity of Ecuador’s indigenous peoples, the country’s low-quality governance environment 
diminished their ability to affect change. Indigenous groups tend to rely on third-party actors (e.g., 
Attorney Donziger) and other international allies (e.g., the Pachamama Foundation) to funnel 
claims. In all, the governance environment shapes individual decision-making as it provides an 
information source that help determine the likelihood of achieving positive outcomes.  These 
examples, however, only provide circumstancial evidence to illustrate our argument.  To identify 
general patterns, we turn to the empirical analysis next.
5. Data and Methods
To test our central argument, we use the Latinobarómetro (2015) survey for individual-
level variables, and the Inter-American Development Bank’s Government Capabilities Index 
(Franco Chuaire & Scartascini, 2014) for country-level governance quality. The Latinobarómetro 
is a cross-sectional study employing the survey respondent as its unit of analysis. It includes a 
randomized sample of 20,250 respondents within 18 Latin American countries.15 As such, it 
creates nationally-representative, random, and stratified surveys that reach both urban and rural 
populations to develop a more robust and representative sampling of the total population, rather 
than selecting the sample on the dependent variable by only analyzing groups most likely to 
participate in these protest actions. As a result of this operationalization, our findings can only be 
generalized to the region in the specified time period. However, given the importance of resource 
extraction to the economies of several developing countries, it remains an important sample to 
analyze.16 
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We use the survey question regarding an individual’s stated likelihood to protest over 
resource extraction as our dependent variable (hereafter, Protest). Latinobarómetro asks 
respondents to choose a Likert scale value from 1 (not at all likely) to 10 (very likely) based on 
their agreement with the statement: “…how willing would you be to demonstrate and protest about 
the extraction of natural resources?”  The median response is 6 on the 10-point scale.  Figure 2 
displays the average response for each country in our sample. Colombia and Ecuador have the 
highest (7.01) and lowest (4.23) average protest likelihoods, respectively.17 
 [Insert Figure 2 about here]
5.1. Individual-Level Characteristics
At the individual-level, an individual’s perceptions of social networks as a tool of political 
action serves as our key independent variable (hereafter, Social Engagement). As stated above, 
social networks provide the organizational resources necessary for collective action, as well as the 
opportunities to join like-minded citizens. For this measure, we use individuals’ attitudes of social 
networks as a viable channel for political participation. Respondents are asked to pick the 
statement with which they most agree: “Social networks allow you to participate in politics”; 
“Social networks create the illusion that you are participating in politics”; “Social networks are 
not suitable for participat[ion] in politics.” The recoded variable, Social Engagement, is 
dichotomous, whereby the survey response of “Social networks allow you to participate in 
politics” is coded 1, and 0 otherwise.18 The decision to exclude respondents answering “Social 
networks create the illusion that you are participating” is due to the greater subjectiveness of the 
statement. While one could interpret the question as implying social networks are a form of low-
cost activism without connection to other forms of political action, another individual could 
interpret social networks as a form of expressing grievances outside of the formal political system.  
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Social engagement plays a vital role in an individual’s likelihood to participate in collective 
action. Research on non-electoral participation finds that networks provide the organizational 
resources and opportunities necessary for individuals to engage in collective action (Jenkins, 1983; 
McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Following resource mobilization literature, engaged citizens have access 
to participation channels that are unavailable to disconnected citizens. When individuals view 
social engagement as a useful avenue for political participation, then they are also likely to be 
politically interested, be politically sophisticated, join activities and organizations, and are likely 
to participate in collective action. 
We also include several controls found to affect mobilization likelihood, such as an 
individual’s civic participation level, the frequency she campaigns for political parties (Campaign 
Frequency), democracy support, presidential approval, interpersonal trust, and personal and 
national economic perceptions (see Appendix, Table 3). Additionally, we control for demographic 
characteristics such as gender, age, socioeconomic status, and education years. 
Because our dependent variable (Protest) measures an individual’s willingness to protest 
over resource extraction, not actual participation, we also control for the individual’s previous 
protest activity (Protest Activity). We use survey answers based on participation in either an 
authorized or unauthorized march or demonstration (see Appendix, Table 2). By controlling for 
actual participation, we isolate an individual’s willingness to protest over resource extraction. 
As environmental attitudes often relate to resource extraction protests (Eisenstadt & West, 
2017), we also control for environmental issue salience (hereafter, Environment). The 
Latinobarómetro (2015) asks respondents to name the most important factors for national 
development. Respondents choose items such as infrastructure, institutions, social policies, and 
the environment. We created a dichotomous measure based on respondent answers mentioning the 
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environment. We expect individuals’ protest likelihood to increase if they prioritize the 
environment when thinking about development. 
Finally, we account for a respondent’s proximity to and experience with extraction by 
including a measurement of the sum total number of mining properties within a 30-kilometer 
radius of a survey respondent (hereafter, Proximity to extraction). We utilize information from 
Infomine (2011), updated by Haslam and Tanimoune (2015), to determine the known universe of 
firms in the region operating at the advanced exploration stage or above. These data provide the 
geospatial locations of 783 active properties in 23 countries. We then determine the number of 
mining properties located close to a survey respondent using a distance of 30 kilometers from a 
survey area to the closest mining property. We derive the survey area by using the geographic 
location variable found in Latinobarómetro, which is known as city (or ciudad) and refers to the 
smallest political or administrative division of a state.
5.2. Country-Level Characteristics 
For country-level data, we utilize the Government Capabilities Index from the Political 
Institutions, Government Capabilities, and Public Policy International Dataset created by the Inter-
American Development Bank (Franco Chuaire & Scartascini, 2014). This index measures each 
country’s policymaking capabilities among four major institutional bodies:  the legislature, 
political parties, the judiciary, and bureaucracies. Previous studies found that these institutions 
often determine policymaking’s effectiveness (Stein & Tommasi, 2007). This continuous-level 
measure ranges from 0 to 4, with lower values indicating low-quality policymaking capabilities. It 
ranges from .77 (Venezuela) to 2.36 (Costa Rica).
We refer to this variable as a country’s Governance Quality. Its dimensions include public 
policy stability, adaptability, coordination, efficiency, and public regardedness.19  It also 
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incorporates legislative capabilities, judicial independence, political party institutionalization, and 
civil service quality. Furthermore, the variable follows the logic of “intertemporal cooperation,” 
meaning these data reflect the policymaking environment as an ongoing process of cumulative 
institutionalization of a government’s capabilities rather than a reflection of the incumbent 
administration (Scartascini & Tommasi, 2014, p. 5-6). It also biases “cooperation as opposed to 
imposition” in the policymaking arena (Scartascini & Tommasi, 2014, p. 5).
Our Governance Quality measure is an appropriate operationalization of our central 
argument. This variable considers overall effectiveness of national institutions in providing day-
to-day basic services across a wide range of policy issues, rather than focusing on a single policy 
dimension. Our hypothesis states that an individual’s willingness to protest over resource 
extraction increases when they perceive the government as having the capacity to respond to their 
demands. If the state fails to provide basic services, then even highly-engaged citizens will be 
unwilling to protest over resource extraction as they do not perceive a policymaking environment 
capable of addressing their grievances. Building on political mediation theory—protests have an 
indirect or mediated effect on outcomes—the state’s policymaking capabilities are crucial in 
responding to the claims of protesters, and thus the perceived efficacy of protests. Therefore, we 
expect socially-engaged individuals to utilize their available resources to protest resource 
extraction when they believe a greater government capacity to deliver good policy outcomes. In 
contrast, citizens will be unlikely to view protests as an effective means of change when the 
policymaking environment is weak, regardless of their level of social engagement. Figure 3 shows 
the variation of this measure for our sample. 
 [Insert Figure 3 about here]
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We also include country-level controls to prevent spuriousness in our correlations, such as 
the natural log of population size, GDP growth, and GINI coefficients. Population and GDP growth 
data come from the World Bank (2015) and GINI data come from the Standardized World Income 
Inequality Database (SWIID) (Solt, 2016).
5.3. Methods
We estimate multilevel models to account for the nested nature of our data (i.e., individual- 
and country-level characteristics) (Snijders & Bosker, 2012). Our data contain information for 
individuals i within countries j. Multilevel modeling permit coefficients to vary randomly within 
the groups (countries j), allowing for the estimation of standard errors while assuming correlation 
of error terms within these groups. Snijders and Bosker (2012, p. 106) also explain that cross-level 
interaction terms can be used to test interactions at the individual- and country-levels.20
Following this logic, we test three models. The first tests only individual-level 
characteristics, the second adds country-level characteristics, and the third model tests the 
interaction between Social Engagement (measured at the individual-level) and Governance 
Quality (measured at the country-level). We expect to find a positive correlation between this 
interactive term and an individual’s willingness to protest over resource extraction. Our dependent 
variable (Protest) is ordinal (10-point scale), therefore, we estimate our models using ordered 
logistic multilevel models with random intercepts. 
6. Results
Table 1 presents our empirical results. Model 1 uses only individual-level variables to 
predict willingness to protest over resource extraction. These results confirm previous protest 
participation studies (Moseley, 2015). According to our model, socially-engaged individuals, who 
are civically-minded and campaign frequently, are more likely on average to protest over resource 
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extraction than less engaged individuals.  We also explore the substantive impact of these variables 
(see Table 2). Based on Model 1, a socially-engaged, civically-minded individual who campaigns 
frequently has close to a 30 percent likelihood of being very likely to protest (a 10 on the 10-point 
protest scale), while a person who is at a 0 on each of these variables is only 19.32 percent likely 
(a difference of about 10 percent). 
[Insert Table 1 about here]
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Models 2 and 3 show the results for the multilevel model and the interactive model, 
respectively. As shown in Model 2, Governance Quality has a positive and statistically significant 
effect on an individual’s likelihood to protest over resource extraction. Model 3 shows the results 
for the interaction (Social Engagement * Governance Quality), which is a more direct test of the 
individual’s decision-making calculus over resource extraction. Following Brambor, Clark, and 
Golder (2006, p. 66), the constitutive terms of the interaction are included in the respective models. 
The results show a positive and statistically significant relationship between the interaction 
variable and protest likelihood. These findings are consistent when including individual- and state-
level controls.
Several control measures appear to be significant predictors of willingness to protest over 
resource extraction. Civic participation, Campaign frequency, and Education years are positive 
and statistically significant across all models, which suggests that civically-minded individuals, 
who are politically-knowledgeable and well-educated, are more likely to protest than those who 
are less civically-minded. Age is negative and statistically significant. Protest activity and 
Environment are both positive and statistically significant predictors of willingness to protest. 
Predictably, concern over environmental protection positively influences protest likelihood. It is 
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also intuitive that previous protest engagement increases protest likelihood. Therefore, even when 
controlling for actual participation in a demonstration, march, or protest, our findings are robust. 
Finally, Proximity to extraction is positive and statistically significant (see Model 4), indicating 
that an individual is willing to protest over extraction when she is located directly in the vicinity 
of these activities.
Table 1’s results only tell us the direction and significance of key independent variables. 
Therefore, we also present the predicted means of our interaction variable to determine the 
substantive impact of our central argument. Figure 4, based on individuals who are very willing to 
protest extraction (i.e., a “10” on Protest), demonstrates that higher governance quality levels 
increase individual protest likelihood. Moreover, socially-engaged individuals possess a higher 
likelihood than non-socially-engaged ones. As predicted probabilities, a socially-engaged person 
is about 10 percent more likely to be a “10” on this scale than a non-socially-engaged individual, 
when Governance Quality is at its highest value (2.36) and all other variables are held constant.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
Our results speak to existing findings on resource conflicts in Latin America. The 
expectation is that countries with high Governance Quality values are more likely to see extractive 
conflicts. Figure 1 is a map of known conflicts near extractive sites, using data from Haslam and 
Tanimoune (2015). For instance, Chile has both a high Governance Quality and a high number of 
extractive conflicts (see Figure 1). Ecuador, on the other hand, has far fewer conflicts and possesses 
a much lower Governance Quality value. Chile and Ecuador are, in fact, at opposite extremes when 
it comes to the number of resource conflicts and governance quality. We find the same trend in 
this paper: an individual’s willingness to participate in a protest against resource extraction 
increases in high-quality Governance Quality states.
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Institutions are not static configurations that incentivize collective action in a given time 
period.  Rather challengers ponder their ability to influence outcomes based on the institutional 
environment where they live, and this, in turn, affects their willingness to engage in collective 
action. As shown in Figure 4, a high-quality governance environment reinforces engaged citizens’ 
willingness to protest over resource extraction because institutions are seen as “source cues” of a 
government’s general capacity to deliver good policy outcomes (similar Barnes & Córdova, 2016).
7. Sensitivity Analysis
In addition to Table 1’s models, we conducted several robustness tests to ensure the 
stability of our findings. First, our measure of social networks (redes sociales) may be interpreted 
by some respondents as social media use to obtain and share political information. Despite the 
generic language of social networks, which can apply to several formal or informal social 
connections, we nevertheless control for frequency of e-mail and internet usage (hereafter, Social 
Media). The sensitivity analysis results are consistent with our previous findings (see Appendix, 
Table 4).
Second, while we argue that our main country-level independent variable, Governance 
Quality, is the most robust operationalization of our central argument, we must consider the 
likelihood that our results are simply a function of this particular measure. Hence, we use the 
World Bank’s Quality of Governance Indicators as alternative measures of a country’s governance 
environment. These measures account for the strength of democratic institutions and overall 
government effectiveness perceptions, and include separate components of Rule of Law, 
Government Effectiveness, and Voice and Accountability. Following Moseley (2015), we also 
create an additive index of these three components (hereafter, Additive).21 Our results are 
consistent with our previous models when we use either the Additive measure of government 
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capabilities or if we use the constituent terms separately (see Appendix, Table 5). Overall, the 
stability of our results across different operationalizations of our independent variable and the use 
of exhaustive controls, demonstrates the robustness of our findings.
8. Conclusion
Existing resource conflict literature mostly dwells on event data from the print media to 
explore the factors affecting mobilization cross-nationally and sub-nationally. Resource conflict 
case studies also examine the coalitions and organizations that drive successful campaigns against 
extractive projects. While these works have made important contributions, none examine 
individual willingness to protest extraction across Latin America.
Our paper shows that both individual- and state-level factors influence an individual’s 
willingness to challenge resource extraction. Socially engaged individuals are more willing to 
protest over resource extraction because, through their active participation in networks and 
organizations, they are more acquainted with the relative strengths and weaknesses of their 
institutional environment, which altogether provides them with information about the expediency 
of collective action. Governance quality, in particular, presents opportunities for engaged 
individuals to challenge resource extraction, albeit in a different way than anticipated by the 
existing literature.
The conventional wisdom, in fact, frames protests as a byproduct of ineffective and 
unresponsive institutions. This argument centers on formal institutions (e.g., the relative openness 
of political structures), and critics have pointed out that political structure offers only a mechanistic 
understanding of social movements (Goodwin & Jasper, 2003). In contrast, political mediation 
theory (Amenta & Young, 1999; Amenta et al., 2010) informs us that movements continuously 
interact with institutions in a dynamic process to influence positive outcomes. Our review of 
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resource conflicts shows that, while mobilizations may have a short-term impact on outcomes, the 
long-term consequences of mobilizations involves a continuous interaction with several different 
institutions. These institutions are linked to a country’s policymaking capabilities and policy 
characteristics, ranging from court decisions to legislative decrees and executive orders. Thus, a 
strong governance track-record reinforces an engaged citizen’s willingness to protest over resource 
extraction because different governmental institutions are seen as “source cues” of good policy 
outcomes (similar Barnes & Córdova, 2016). In low-quality governance environments, by contrast, 
citizens are deprived of this salient source of information, and accordingly, they are less likely to 
protest over resource extraction.
While our results show that the likelihood of collective action over resource extraction is 
politically mediated, there are several instances where citizens contest fiercely against mining, 
even leading to the deaths of protesters (Bond & Kirsch, 2015).  Global Witness (2014) records 
1,024 deaths of environmental activists between 2002 and 2014 around the world—a period that 
overlaps with the escalation of extractive conflicts globally.  In 2017, almost 60% of the killings 
registered were from Latin America and Brazil had the highest number of deaths (57 people) 
(Global Witness 2017).  Citizens near extractive areas seek to defend basic rights (e.g., water 
access, the cultural survival of indigenous peoples) in response to the ecological threats associated 
with mining.  Leaders of social organizations fighting extraction have also faced arrests, police 
violence, defamation, intimidation, and other forms of repression. Future research should 
investigate how these forms of repression impact collective action over resource extraction.
Our study on the willingness to participate in protests over resource extraction is limited 
by the Latinobarómetro surveys’ questions. Yet we find congruence between our measure of social 
engagement and Moseley’s indicator of community engagement—an indicator that gauges the 
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frequency with which citizens participate in local organizations. Both indicators capture the dense 
organizational networks that are pivotal to sustain mobilizations. The Latinobarómetro surveys 
also do not allow us to explore the reasons for the challenge. However, building on Eisenstadt and 
West (2019), future research should explore the environmental attitudes of citizens living near 
extractive areas, including how the expectation of benefits from extraction may mitigate some of 
their environmental concerns.
Future research should also explore how extractive industries interact with social and 
political organizations to avoid conflict and gain access to resources. Amengual (2018) recently 
showed that extractive industries distribute benefits in inclusive ways when cohesive social 
organizations are present. Conversely, extractive industries distribute benefits in targeted (or 
clientelistic) ways when fragmented social organizations are present. Gustafsson (2017) also 
showed that when host communities are politically weak relative to extractive industries, 
corporate-community relations are likely to result in demobilization or clientelism. However, when 
host communities are able to establish a more equitable balance of power, corporate-community 
relationships tend to produce either confrontation or strategic collaboration. Successful resistance 
campaigns against resource extraction are proportional to the activists’ network cohesion. And, as 
this paper shows, the likelihood of these campaigns to influence positive outcomes increases when 
protest movements leverage the strengths of their institutional environment to their advantage.
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Figure 1: Location of Mining Conflicts in Latin America
Source: Haslam and Tanimoune (2015).
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Figure 2. Mean Likelihood to Protest over Resource Extraction
Source: Latinobarómetro (2015).
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Figure 3. Mean Value of Governance Quality
Source: Franco Chuaire & Scartascini (2015).
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Table 1: Likelihood to Protest over Resource Extraction
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4___





Social Engagement 0.251*** 0.231*** -0.182 -0.184
(0.046) (0.045) (0.161) (0.187)
Civic Participation 0.209*** 0.218*** 0.215*** 0.210***
(0.047) (0.048) (0.049) (0.054)
Campaign Frequency 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.126*** 0.132***
(0.031) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032)
Gender -0.009 -0.013 -0.014 -0.005
(0.030) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033)
Age -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Socioeconomic Status 0.016 0.012 0.012 0.012
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030)
Education Years 0.013** 0.013** 0.013** 0.012**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Presidential Approval -0.075 -0.055 -0.054 -0.036
(0.057) (0.054) (0.053) (0.055)
Interpersonal Trust -0.006 0.015 0.013 0.030
(0.070) (0.069) (0.070) (0.069)
Personal Economic 0.042 0.029 0.028 0.023
Perceptions (0.027) (0.022) (0.022) (0.027)
National Economic -0.043 -0.039 -0.038 -0.042
Perceptions (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030)
Support for Democracy 0.030 0.034 0.034 0.028
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029)
Protest Activity 0.595*** 0.603*** 0.600*** 0.608***
(0.087) (0.091) (0.089) (0.097)
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Environment 0.118*** 0.117*** 0.120*** 0.113***
(0.039) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040)
Proximity to Extraction -- -- -- 0.017***
(0.006)
Country-Level Variables
Governance Quality * -- -- 0.286** 0.278**
Social Engagement (0.112) (0.133)
Governance Quality -- 0.256*** 0.184** 0.217**
(0.094) (0.090) (0.086)
GINI -- 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.053***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Population (ln) -- 0.084* 0.084* 0.066
(0.048) (0.049) (0.046)
GDP Growth -- 0.075** 0.077** 0.080***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.030)
Level 1 N 15,736 15,003 15,003 13,167
Level 2 N 18 17 17 17
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 (Robust standard errors). Multilevel ordered logistic regression 
models with random intercepts.
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Table 2: Predicted Probabilities of Likelihood to Protest over Resource Extraction by Levels of 
Civic and Political Engagement
Levels of civic and
political engagement22
Predicted Probabilities Confidence Intervals
Low .1932 [.1607, .2257]
High .2986 [.2567, .3406]
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Figure 4: Predictive Margins of Protesting over Resource Extraction
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1  Eisenstadt and West (2017, 2019) is an important exception. Using individual-level survey 
data, the authors find that individuals in Ecuador express environmental concern when they are 
objectively vulnerable to environmental damage and when they live in areas in which extraction 
has occurred or is debated. 
2 Based on this imperative, as Arsel et al. (2016b) explain, “extraction needs to continue and 
expand regardless of prevailing circumstances, with the state playing a leading role and capturing 
a large share of the ensuing revenues.”
3  This is particularly common when there is competition between local subsistence agriculture 
and the incoming extractive industry (Conde, 2016, p. 82).
4  Our discussion on the quality of governance builds on Barnes and Córdova (2016).
5  Political mediation theory suggests that the influence of movement collective action is 
contingent on specific contexts.
6 The logic behind the quality of institutions translating into public assessments is partly based in 
the theoretical models of Barnes and Córdova (2016) on support for gender quotas in Latin 
America.
7  Moseley’s dependent variable comes from Vanderbilt’s LAPOP surveys. These surveys can be 
found at: https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/. Our study uses the Latinobarómetro data based in 
Santiago, Chile. The Latinobarómeter can be found at: http://www.latinobarometro.org/ 
8  We test for this curvilinear effect through a robustness check incorporating quadratic forms of 
our institutional variable (Governance Quality), but do not find statistically significant results. 
This indicates a need for further exploration of this relationship in future studies, and the 
uniqueness of protests around resource extraction as opposed to demonstrations around other 
issues. 
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9 See Felipe Iturrieta, “Escondida workers to end strike as they opt for the old contract,” Reuters 
(March 3, 2017).
10 See “World’s biggest copper mine Escondida hit by workers strikes amid labor law reform,” 
Deutsche Welle (February 15, 2017).
11 Unlike Chile, the mineral sector in Ecuador is less important. Mineral rents were 0.1 per cent 
of the country’s GDP in 2014 (World Bank, 2016). 
12 See “Texaco/Chevron lawsuits” (https://business-humanrights.org/en/texacochevron-lawsuits-
re-ecuador). Accessed November 11, 2017.
13  Since 1993, PetroEcuador is the sole owner of this project.
14 See Clifford Krauss, “Lawyer Who Beat Chevron in Ecuador Faces Trial of His Own,” The New 
York Times (July 30, 2013). http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/31/business/steven-donziger-
lawyer-who-beat-chevron-in-ecuador-faces-trial-of-his-own.html
15  The list of countries is as follows:  Brazil (1,250 respondents); Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela (1,200 respondents each 
country); Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and 
Panama (1,000 respondents each country). See Appendix for the descriptive statistics for all 
variables in our models (Table 1), as well as the coding for these variables (Table 2).
16 See http://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp for more details on the survey.
17  The operationalization of the dependent variable measures specifically a citizen’s likelihood to 
protest extractive policies.  As it does not aggregate all types of protests, our measure provides a 
more accurate representation of a citizen’s decision-making calculus over resource extraction. 
18 We recognize that our measure of social engagement based on social networks does not 
capture the complexity of this concept. While our main analysis focuses on this variable, we also 
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account for other social engagement variables such as civic participation and participation in 
political campaigns (see Table 1). We view these variables as conceptually similar and use them 
to capture the complexity of social engagement.
19  Appendix (Table 4) provides a detailed breakdown of the component parts of this index.
20  We also find that the total variance accounted for by the variance between countries 
(Intraclass Correlation Coefficient, or ICC) is statistically significant (at the p<.001 level) and 
equal to 3.48 percent. Previous works by Anderson and Singer (2008) and Barnes and Córdova 
(2016) show that “in cross-national research the variation between countries depicted by the ICC 
tends to be relatively small in studies that use survey data, because the number of cases at the 
individual level is much larger than the number of cases at the country-level” (p. 14). 
21 Additive had a Cronbach’s alpha reliability produced a value of .955, well about the standard 
.7 suggested for creating additive indices. 
22  The prediction is for a strong willingness to protest over resource extraction (measured as a 
“10” on the Latinobarometer survey question). Levels of civic and political engagement are 
based on the variables Social Engagement, Civic Participation, and Campaign Frequency. A low 
level of civic and political engagement is based on a value of “0” for each of these variables, 
with the remaining variables at their mean. A high level of civic and political engagement is 
based on a value of “1” for each of these variables, with the remaining variables at their mean.
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Appendix. Summary Statistics and Variable Descriptions
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
Governance Quality 20,250 1.4055 .4806 .7695 2.3625
Campaign Frequency 19,565 1.3891 .7209 1 4
Civic Participation 20,250 .2071 .4052 0 1
Social Engagement 20,250 .2646 .4411 0 1
Population (ln) 20,250 16.6360 1.1537 15.0485 19.1523
Protest (Resource Extraction) 19,500 5.8643 3.3822 1 10
Sex 20,250 1.5159 .4998 1 2
Age 20,250 40.3696 16.4929 16 98
Socioeconomic Status 19,653 2.3098 .9282 1 5
Education (years) 20,250 9.9063 4.5270 1 17
Presidential Approval 18,768 .5035 .5000 0 1
Interpersonal Trust 19,789 1.1730 .3782 1 2
Personal Economic 
Perception
20,143 3.1988 .7630 1 5
National Economic 
Perception
20,097 2.8459 .9162 1 5
Support for Democracy 18,582 2.4537 .7661 1 3
GINI 20,250 43.6168 3.4925 36.92 48.91
Growth (annual) 19,050 2.8267 2.3872 -3.8474 7.0409
Proximity to Extraction 17,850 .3745 1.0828 0 18
Environment 20,250 .4275 .4947 0 1
Protest Activity 20,250 .1186 .3233 0 1
Social Media 18,831 2.2351 1.2711 1 4
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Table 2. Latinobarómetro Survey Question Variable Descriptions
Variable Description
Protest ‘On a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 means ‘not 
at all’ and 10 ‘very’, how willing would you 
be to demonstrate and protest about…? 
 ‘Exploitation of natural resources’ 
10-point scale; higher values = greater 
likelihood to protest.
Social Engagement ‘With which of the following statements do 
you agree most?’ 
 ‘Social networks allow you to 
participate in politics’ 
 ‘Social networks create the illusion 
that you are participating in politics’
 ‘Social networks are not suitable for 
participate [sic] in politics’
 Do not know
 Did not answer
Scores were dichotomized and coded as 1 if 
“Social networks allow you to participate in 
politics,” 0 otherwise. 
Civic Participation ‘Which of the following things do you think a 
person must do in order to be considered a 
citizen?’ (Multiple responses allowed)
 ‘Vote in elections’
 ‘Pay taxes’
 ‘Always obey laws and regulations’
 ‘Participate in social organizations’
 ‘Participate in political organizations’
 ‘Choose products that are 
environmentally responsible’
 ‘Help people in (country) who are 
worse off than yourself’
 ‘Be willing to service in the military at 
time of need’
 Do not know/did not answer
Scores were dichotomized and coded as 1 if 
“Participate in social organizations” and 
“Participate in political organizations” was 
chosen, 0 otherwise.  
Personal Economic Perceptions ‘In general, how would you describe your 
present economic situation and that of your 






5. Very good 
* These values have been inverted so that 
higher values indicate a more positive view of 
the economic situation than lower values. 
5-point scale: higher values = more positive 
view of personal economic situation. 
National Economic Perceptions ‘In general, how would you describe the 
country’s present economic situation? Would 






* These values have been inverted so that 
higher values indicate a more positive view of 
the economic situation than lower values.
5-point scale: higher values = more positive 
view of country’s economic situation.
Campaign Frequency ‘How frequently do you do each of the 
following things? Very frequently, frequently, 
almost never or never?’ 
 ‘Work for a political party or 
candidate’
Coded as 1 for “Never,” 2 for “Almost 
never,” 3 for “Frequently,” 4 for “Very 
frequently.” 
Interpersonal Trust ‘Generally speaking, would you say that you 
can trust most people, or that you can never 
be too careful when dealing with others?’
Coded as 1 if “One can never be too careful 
when dealing with others,” 2 if “One can trust 
most people”.
Age ‘What is your age?’
Respondent’s age in years. 
Gender ‘Gender of the interviewee’ 
Coded as 1 if “Male,” 2 if “Female.”
Presidential Approval ‘Do you approve or not the performance of 
the government led by President (name)?’ 
Coded as 0 if “Disapprove,” 1 if “Approve”.
Support for Democracy ‘With which of the following statements do 
you agree most?’ 
4
Answers were dichotomized and coded 1 
if “Democracy is preferable to any other 
kind of government,” 0 otherwise. 
Education (years) ‘What level of education do you have?’
Without education (1); 1 year (2); 2 years 
(3); 3 years (4); 4 years (5); 5 years (6); 6 
years (7); 7 years (8); 8 years (9); 9 years 
(10); 10 years (11); 11 years (12); 12 
years (13); Incomplete university (14); 
Completed university (15); High 
school/academies/Incomplete technical 
(16); High school/academies/Complete 
technical (17)
Socioeconomic Status ‘People sometimes describe themselves as 
belonging to a social class. Which social class 







*This scale has been inversed so that higher 
values indicate higher socioeconomic status.
5-point scale: higher values = higher 
socioeconomic status. 
Protest Activity ‘I am going to read out a variety of political 
activities that people can undertake and I 
would like you to tell me, if you have ever 
done any of them (1), if you would never do 
any of them (2), or if you would never do any 
of them (3).’
b. Attended an authorized demonstration 
or protest march
c. Attended an unauthorized 
demonstration, protest march, block 
traffic
Protest Activity is coded (1) if answers to (b) 
and (c) are 1 (“done any of them”), and 0 
otherwise. 
Environment ‘From the following list of topics, tell me 
which are the most important for the 






Integration to the world
Social policies
None of the above
Do not know
Did not answer
Coded as 1 if respondent answered that the 
environment was the most important issue, 0 
otherwise. 








Coded as 1 if “Yes, every day” or “Yes, 
occasionally,” 0 otherwise.
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Table 3. Description of component variables in Governance Quality
Component Variable Description
Stability the extent to which policies are stable over 
time
Adaptability the extent to which policies are adjusted when 
they fail or when circumstances change
Coherence and Coordination the degree to which policies are consistent 
with related policies, and result from well-
coordinated actions among the actors who 
participate in their design and implementation
Quality of implementation and enforcement the degree to which policies are implemented 
and enforced properly after the approval in 
Congress
Public-regardedness the degree to which policies pursue the public 
interest
Efficiency the extent to which policies reflect an 
allocation of scarce resources that ensures 
high returns
Note: Language is borrowed from Scartascini & Tommasi (2014, p. 8).
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Robustness Checks
Table 4: Likelihood to Protest over Resource Extraction Controlling for Social Media
Model 1











































Level 1 N 13,829
Level 2 N 16
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 (Robust standard errors). 
Multilevel ordered logistic regression models with 
random intercepts. 
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Table 5: Multilevel Ordered Logistic Regression: Likelihood to Protest over Resource Extraction 
with Alternative Operationalization of Governance Quality
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4               
Additive * Rule of Law * Government Voice and
Social Social Effectiveness * Accountability
Engagement Engagement Social * Social 
Engagement Engagement
Individual-Level Variables
Social Engagement 0.264*** 0.314*** 0.282*** 0.194***
(0.041) (0.043) (0.039) (0.043)
Civic Participation 0.216*** 0.216*** 0.216*** 0.215***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Campaign Frequency 0.126*** 0.125*** 0.126*** 0.125***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Gender -0.015 -0.016 -0.015 -0.014
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Age -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Socioeconomic Status 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Education Years 0.013** 0.013** 0.013** 0.012**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Presidential Approval -0.052 -0.053 -0.052 -0.052
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053)
Interpersonal Trust 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.014
(0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070)
Personal Economic 0.028 0.029 0.027 0.028
Perceptions (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
National Economic -0.038 -0.039 -0.037 -0.038
Perceptions (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028)
Support for Democracy 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Protest Activity 0.600*** 0.600*** 0.600*** 0.601***
(0.089) (0.090) (0.089) (0.089)
Environment 0.121*** 0.119*** 0.123*** 0.119***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Country-Level Variables
Additive * 0.089*** -- -- --
Social Engagement (0.026)
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Additive * -- 0.230*** -- --
Social Engagement (0.052)
Additive * -- -- 0.277*** --
Social Engagement (0.081)
Additive * -- -- -- 0.208**
Social Engagement (0.102)
Additive 0.033 -- -- --
(0.028)
Rule of Law -- 0.100 -- --
(0.070)
Government -- -- 0.052 --
Effectiveness (0.078)
Voice and -- -- -- 0.129
Accountability (0.099)
GINI 0.056*** 0.051*** 0.058*** 0.060***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013)
Population (ln) 0.080 0.093* 0.062 0.085*
(0.051) (0.055) (0.048) (0.049)
GDP Growth 0.067** 0.072** 0.060** 0.067**
(0.030) (0.031) (0.029) (0.031)
Level 1 N 15,003 15,003 15,003 15,003
Level 2 N 17 17 17 17
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 (Robust standard errors). Multilevel ordered logistic regression 
models with random intercepts.
